USA v. Quintrell Reynos by unknown
2012 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-22-2012 
USA v. Quintrell Reynos 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Quintrell Reynos" (2012). 2012 Decisions. 903. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012/903 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2012 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
__________ 
 
No. 11-1398 
__________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
QUINTRELL REYNOS, 
 
                  Appellant 
__________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 
(D.C. No. 2-09-cr-00618-002) 
District Judge:  The Honorable Mitchell S. Goldberg 
 
ARGUED JANUARY 10, 2012 
 
BEFORE:  RENDELL, AMBRO, and  
NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
 
(Filed :  May 22, 2012) 
 
 
2 
 
Megan S. Scheib, Esq. [Argued] 
William J. Winning, Esq. 
Cozen O’Connor 
1900 Market Street, 3rd Floor 
Philadelphia, PA  19103 
 Counsel for Appellant 
 
Joseph T. Labrum, III, Esq. 
Robert A. Zauzmer, Esq. [Argued] 
Office of the United States Attorney 
615 Chestnut Street, Suite 1250 
Philadelphia, PA  19106  
 Counsel for Appellee 
__________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________ 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge 
 
 This appeal asks us to determine whether the District 
Court erred by enhancing the Appellant’s offense level with a 
4-level increase for an abduction.  Although the issue is 
simply stated, the question of what constitutes an abduction 
within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(A) has not 
been addressed by this Court until today.  
 
I. 
 It was nearly midnight on April 18, 2009, when 
Appellant Quintrell Reynos and another individual robbed 
Ed’s Pizza House in Philadelphia.  Reynos was charged with 
Hobbs Act robbery and conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act 
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robbery, violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) and 2 (Counts One 
and Two) and with using and carrying a firearm during a 
crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c) and 2 
(Count Three).1
 
  Reynos pleaded guilty to all three counts.  At 
the plea hearing, the Government set forth the following 
factual background:   
Three witnesses were working at 
the pizza shop at the time of the 
robbery: Juan Gutierrez, Jose 
Canabill, and Julian Costeo.  
Gutierrez2
 
 was moving from the 
cash register to the pizza oven 
shortly before midnight when he 
observed the other employees 
backing-up in the direction of the 
back door.  Believing a robbery 
was about to take place, Gutierrez 
and his fellow employees went to 
the back of the shop and locked 
themselves into the bathroom.  
One of the workers called the 
police from a cell phone. 
                                              
1 The Hobbs Act, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1951, is a federal 
law prohibiting actual or attempted robbery or extortion that 
affects interstate or foreign commerce.  Section 1951 also 
proscribes conspiracy to commit such a robbery or extortion 
without reference to the conspiracy statute at 18 U.S.C. § 371. 
2 We correct the phonetic misspelling of Gutierrez’s name in 
the transcript here, and throughout our opinion. 
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Thereafter, the black males [sic] 
started to kick in the bathroom 
door, gained entry and said he 
needed one of them to open up the 
cash register or I’ll start shooting.  
[Employee] Gutierrez saw the 
male who he later identified as a 
person who frequented the store 
regularly and he was later 
identified as Quintrell Reynos and 
it was Reynos who brandished 
what Gutierrez has described as a 
large, black automatic pistol.   
 
At Reynos’ demand, Gutierrez 
opened the cash register.  Reynos 
took the money in the cash 
register and then stated “do you 
have any more money?  Reynos 
started to search Gutierrez.  
Reynos then said, “Jose, where’s 
the money?”  It was at this point 
that Gutierrez recognized Reynos 
from seeing him in the store many 
times before and serving him 
food.  Reynos asked for keys to 
the back door.  Gutierrez 
explained that the key was in the 
back.  Reynos then moved toward 
the back of the shop and at that 
point, all of the employees ran out 
the front door of the shop. 
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Reynos did not challenge these facts. 
 A presentence report was prepared.  Pursuant to the 
Sentencing Guidelines, Reynos’ base offense level was set at 
20.  The PSR recommended a 4-point upward adjustment in 
the offense level for abducting the pizza shop employees, 
pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(A).  The PSR also 
recommended a 3-point reduction in the offense level, 
resulting in a total base offense level of 21.  Reynos’ criminal 
history category was originally put at a Category III, but was 
later reduced to a Category I.   
 
 Thus, the advisory sentencing range was identified as 
between 37 and 46 months incarceration.  A mandatory 
consecutive sentence of 120 months was also called for as a 
result of Reynos’ violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). 
 
 The District Court, over Reynos’ objection, agreed 
with the PSR and enhanced his offense level by 4 points, 
finding his actions to have constituted an abduction under the 
Guidelines.  After considering all of the appropriate 
sentencing factors, the District Court imposed a sentence of 
157-months imprisonment.  Reynos now appeals, arguing that 
the District Court procedurally erred by enhancing his offense 
level for abducting the pizza shop employees. 
 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3231 and we have appellate jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.  “When reviewing the sentencing decisions of 
the district courts, we exercise plenary review over legal 
questions about the meaning of the [S]entencing [G]uidelines, 
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but apply the deferential clearly erroneous standard to factual 
determinations underlying their application.”  United States v. 
Collado, 975 F.2d 985, 990 (3d Cir.1992). We assess whether 
a district court committed a “significant procedural error” and 
whether the ultimate sentence was substantially reasonable.  
United States v. Larkin, 629 F.3d 177, 181 (3d Cir. 2010).  
  
Here, Reynos challenges only the procedural 
reasonableness of his sentence.  Because he does not 
challenge any other part of the District Court’s sentencing 
calculation, or take issue with the substantive reasonableness 
of the District Court’s decision, Reynos has waived any 
challenge on those grounds.  See United States v. Negroni, 
638 F.3d 434, 440 n.4 (3d Cir. 2011).  Reynos alleges two 
procedural errors: 1) that the District Court improperly 
applied the abduction enhancement to his sentence, and 2) 
that the District Court engaged in “double counting” by 
enhancing Reynos’ sentencing for abduction where the use of 
the handgun actually served as the basis of his conviction 
under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).   
 
III. 
A. 
 We begin with the abduction enhancement.  The pre-
sentence report recommended an upward adjustment for 
abduction based on Reynos’ “kick[ing] open the bathroom 
door where the restaurant employees sought refuge, 
abduct[ing] them at gunpoint, and forc[ing] them to the cash 
register area.”  Section 2B3.1(b)(4)(A) provides for a four-
level increase in the base offense level for robbery “if any 
person was abducted to facilitate commission of the offense 
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or to facilitate escape.”  “Abducted” means that a victim was 
“forced to accompany an offender to a different location.  For 
example, a bank robber’s forcing a bank teller from the bank 
into a getaway car could constitute an abduction.”  § 1B1.1, 
comment. (n.1(a)).   
 
 From this Guideline, we distill three predicates that 
must be met before the abduction enhancement can be 
applied.  First, the robbery victims must be forced to move 
from their original position; such force being sufficient to 
permit a reasonable person an inference that he or she is not 
at liberty to refuse.  Second, the victims must accompany the 
offender to that new location.  Third, the relocation of the 
robbery victims must have been to further either the 
commission of the crime or the offender’s escape.3
                                              
3Our dissenting colleague emphasizes the need to find that the 
defendant forcibly moved the victim “in a manner and/or for 
a reason that the abduction enhancement was specifically 
designed to prevent.”  In addition to the examples of such 
reasons the dissent mentions, § 2B3.1(4)(A) makes clear that 
forcing movement to facilitate commission of the crime is a 
circumstance the enhancement was specifically designed to 
prevent.  Thus, even if we were to agree with our colleague 
that this additional requirement exists, we would find that it is 
met in this case, where Reynos kicked in a locked bathroom 
door and threatened the store employees with a gun before 
forcing at least one of them to accompany him to the cash 
register to commit the offense.  We find no support in the 
Guidelines, the accompanying commentary, or the caselaw 
for our colleague's suggestion that cases involving forcible 
movement to facilitate the commission of the offense should 
be treated differently than cases involving such movement to 
  Whether 
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or not the Government has established these predicates 
would, of course, be reviewed for plain error, with the degree 
of distance or definition of location, entrusted as it must be, to 
the sound discretion of the District Court.   
 
 Reynos attacks the addition of this enhancement to his 
sentence.  He argues three distinct points: first, that the record 
is devoid of evidence proving he used “force” against the 
pizza shop employees; second,  that the record is silent on 
whether the employees accompanied him from the bathroom 
to the cash register; and third, that moving from the bathroom 
to the cash register is a not a change of location.  
  
1. Use of Force 
 We start with the enhancement’s requirement of a use 
of force.  Reynos argues that nothing in the record indicates 
he used actual force against any pizza shop employee.  No 
victim, he argues, was “goaded, forced, dragged or shoved 
from the bathroom door to the cash register.”  True enough.  
No one was “goaded” into leaving the bathroom.  And, we do 
not know whether any actual physical force—such as shoving 
or dragging—was exerted on the victims.  The record’s 
silence on the exertion of any physical force is of no moment, 
however.   
 
 Nothing within the plain meaning of the abduction 
enhancement’s use of the term ‘force’ confines its meaning 
solely to physical force.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Cunningham, 201 F.3d 20, 28 (1st Cir. 2000).  As the Court in 
                                                                                                     
facilitate the offender's escape, or that such cases require 
proof of an additional, “aggravating circumstance.”  
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Cunningham noted, the term “force” connotes compelling 
someone “by physical, moral or intellectual means” or “to 
impose” or “to win one’s way.”  Id. (citing Webster’s Seventh 
New Collegiate Dictionary 326 (1970)).   Furthermore, the 
abduction enhancement’s intention—at least in part—is to 
protect victims against additional harm that may come to 
them by virtue of their isolation.  United States v. Whooten, 
279 F.3d 58, 61 (1st Cir. 2002).  The enhancement applies, 
therefore, whether the abduction involved physical force or 
just the threat of such an assault.  Id.   
 
 We will not, therefore, limit the application of the 
abduction enhancement to only those scenarios that include 
the exertion of actual physical force.  We agree with those 
courts that have found, as a matter of policy that an abduction 
achieved through threat, fear and/or intimidation, “carries the 
same dangerous consequences as an abduction accomplished 
by the use of physical force.”  Cunningham, 201 F.3d at 28.  
In both instances, the offender is able to isolate his or her 
victims, thereby increasing the chance that they will be 
harmed.  Id. (quoting United States v. Saknikent, 30 F.3d 
1012, 1013-14 (8th Cir. 1994)).  In Cunningham, supra, the 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit observed that the 
abduction enhancement, at least in part, was designed to 
protect victims from isolation, and thus applies whether the 
abduction is carried out by threat, intimidation or by physical 
violence.  201 F.3d at 28.  Likewise, in Saknikent, the Court 
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found that “the abduction 
enhancement requires only that force necessary to overcome 
the particular victim’s will.”  30 F.3d at 1014. 
 
Here, we note first that the victims had fled to a place 
of relative safety—a small bathroom, behind a locked door—
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once the robbery commenced.  Then, after Reynos forced 
open the bathroom door, the victims pointedly saw him 
‘brandish’ a large, black automatic pistol.  The Guidelines 
define “brandishing” as meaning “all or part of the weapon 
displayed, or the presence of the weapon was otherwise made 
known to another person in order to intimidate that person.”  
See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1, comment. (n.1(C)) (emphasis added).  
We have no hesitation in concluding that the brandishing of a 
weapon is a use of force for purposes of the abduction 
enhancement.  Reynos wielded a lethal weapon in order to 
intimidate the victims by threatening to shoot them.  This was 
an intimidating use of force designed to compel the victims to 
assist Reynos by opening the cash register.  There is sufficient 
evidence on this record to support the conclusion that Reynos 
exerted force against the victims.   
 
2. Accompaniment  
 The abduction enhancement requires that the robbery 
victims accompany the offender to a new location.  § 1B1.1, 
comment. (n.1(a)).  Reynos argues that no evidence exists in 
the record to suggest that the pizza shop employees 
accompanied him to the cash register.  At oral argument, the 
Government conceded that the record merely points to 
evidence that the pizza shop employees walked with Reynos 
from the bathroom to the cash register area.   But, the 
Government argues, when looking at the facts in their totality, 
it was not erroneous for the District Court to find that the 
victims accompanied Reynos to the cash register, a factual 
determination that we review for clear error.  See United 
States v. Givan, 320 F.3d 452, 459 (3d Cir. 2003).   
 
11 
 
 Here, the facts reveal that, after kicking-in the 
bathroom door, Reynos demanded that the victims open the 
cash register for him or he would “start shooting.”  At this 
point, all three employees and Reynos were together at the 
bathroom.  The next event in the timeline finds pizza shop 
employee Gutierrez with Reynos at the cash register.  We 
know they are there because, as Reynos is taking the money 
from the cash drawer, he asks Gutierrez if there is any other 
cash in the shop.  Reynos also physically searches   Gutierrez 
at this point, an action Reynos could not have undertaken had 
Gutierrez not accompanied him to the cash drawer.  When 
Reynos eventually retreated to the back of the shop, the 
employees fled out the front of the store.  From these 
uncontested facts, we can easily surmise that the employees 
and Reynos were together at the cash register whereas before 
they were together at the bathroom.   It defies common sense 
to argue that the employees did not accompany Reynos from 
the bathroom to the cash register.  We therefore have little 
trouble concluding from this record that the victims 
accompanied Reynos from the bathroom to the cash register.   
 
 Furthermore, the record conclusively establishes that 
Reynos forced the victims to accompany him to facilitate the 
robbery of the cash register.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Hawkins, 87 F.3d 722, 728 (5th Cir. 1996) (accompaniment 
made in connection with a getaway).  The record clearly 
indicates that Reynos ordered the victims to accompany him 
to the cash register and that at least one victim, Gutierrez, 
opened the register for Reynos.  Reynos had no reason to 
come into contact with the victims, other than to force them 
to join him.  Presumably, he could have committed his 
robbery offense alone, leaving the pizza shop employees 
locked in the bathroom.  Because Reynos used force to move 
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the victims from the bathroom to the cash register and 
because the victims accompanied him there, the abduction 
enhancement was properly applied, unless the relocation from 
the bathroom area to the cash register site was not a change in 
location. 
 
3. Change in Location 
 At oral argument, the parties focused their 
disagreement on the previous question—whether the victims 
accompanied Reynos from the bathroom to the cash register.  
Their briefing, however, devotes the largest portion of 
argument to the question of whether moving from the 
bathroom area to the cash register amounted to a change in 
location.  Reynos maintains that this movement—a distance 
of approximately thirty-four feet—did not amount to a change 
in location.  He argues that the narrow confines of Ed’s Pizza 
House constituted a singular site and no change in location 
could have occurred unless Reynos moved the victims outside 
of the facility.  The Government disagrees. 
 
 We have not considered this question previously and 
we have no precedent interpreting what constitutes a change 
of location for purposes of the abduction enhancement.  Other 
courts, however, have addressed the issue. 
 
 In United States v. Hawkins, 87 F.3d 722 (5th Cir. 
1996), for example, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
held that the term “different location” should be interpreted 
flexibly, on a case-by-case basis.  Id. at 726-28.  At issue in 
Hawkins was whether moving a victim at gunpoint 40 or 50 
feet across a parking lot to a van amounted to an abduction 
(the victim in Hawkins fled before being actively put into a 
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van).  The Court of Appeals determined that the term 
“different location,” as set out in the comments to § 1B1.1, is 
“flexible and thus susceptible of multiple interpretations, 
which are applied case by case to the particular facts under 
scrutiny, not mechanically based in the presence or absence 
of doorways, lot lines, thresholds and the like.”  Id. at 727-28; 
see also United States v. Johnson, 619 F.3d 469, 472 (5th Cir. 
2010).  The Court explained further: 
 
In ordinary parlance, “location” 
can refer to an outside building or 
parking lot, so that a miniscule 
movement, such as the crossing of 
a threshold separating interior and 
exterior of a building, would 
constitute movement to a different 
location. 
 
On the other hand, in ordinary 
parlance, “location” is frequently 
used in reference to a single point 
where a person is standing, or to 
one among several rooms in the 
same structure, or to different 
floors in the same building.  In 
other words, while movement 
from outside to inside, or vice 
versa, or movement across a 
property line, might be factors 
giving support to a conclusion of 
“different locations,” the absence 
of such facts does not bar such a 
conclusion.   
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Id.   
 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has also 
followed Hawkins’ approach.  In United States v. Osborne, 
514 F.3d at 389, 90 (4th Cir. 2008), the Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit affirmed the application of an abduction 
enhancement where the victims were forcibly moved from 
one section of a drugstore to another.  In Osborne, the 
offender used force to move the victims from the secured 
pharmacy section of a Walgreens drugstore, across the retail 
floor, stopping at the front of the store.  Id. at 389-90.  
Important to the Osborne Court was the fact that the 
pharmacy area and retail portion of the store were separated 
by a counter as well as a secure door which could be opened 
only by authorized personnel through the use of a digital 
keypad.  Id. at 390.  The Osborne court also deemed it 
important that the offender had moved the victims in order to 
facilitate his escape.  Id. 
 
 We find the flexible approach outlined in the Hawkins 
and Osborne decisions to have considerable merit.  The term 
‘location’ connotes several things; hence, the necessity of a 
flexible definition.  Certainly, two separate physical structures 
are two distinct locations.  And, a location does not need to 
have a physical construct—a park or the beach can be a 
location just as a courthouse or church.  No one could argue 
that moving from one of these physical structures or 
geographic locations to another is not a change in location.  
The term ‘location,’ however, is broad enough to encompass 
different points of reference within the constructs of a single 
building or geographic site.  See Osborne, 514 F.3d at 389.  A 
courthouse, for example, has numerous distinct locations 
within: a clerk’s office, courtrooms, security offices and 
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judicial chambers are all separate and distinct locations within 
the same structure.  Paring it down further, a judge’s 
chambers in that same courthouse may have several locations: 
a reception area, judge’s office, law clerk cubicles and file 
rooms, for example.  Of course, the smaller the space, the 
more difficult it is to find a change in location.  But, even 
then, the smallest of areas still may contain different 
locations: a judge’s private office may have a location 
containing a desk and computer that is separate and distinct 
from a location containing a conference table and chairs.  It is 
precisely because of the broad scope of the term ‘location’ 
that courts must use a highly flexible approach in finding one; 
an approach that recognizes that the abduction enhancement 
may properly be applied even though the victim remained 
within the confines of a single building.  Hawkins at 728. 
   
 After thoroughly reviewing the facts before it, the 
District Court in this case found a change in location, 
determining: 
 
I think the Government says that 
it was 39 feet from the locked 
bathroom to the cash register.  
The defense says it was 34 feet.  I 
don’t know that it makes much of 
a difference.  For the benefit of 
the doubt of the Defendant, I’ll 
find that it was 34 feet, but when I 
originally looked at the picture of 
the pizzeria, it seemed that the 
bathroom and the cash register 
were in close proximity, but the 
video was very illuminating; 
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they’re not.  They’re [sic], and I 
won’t describe it perfectly, but 
you have to go down a couple 
different halls to get from one 
area of the bathroom which is far 
away from the register, so it’s not 
a matter of one being right next to 
the other.  We have, at least based 
on the Defense’s version, 34 feet. 
 
This finding was not erroneous.  The record fully supports the 
District Court’s determination.  The District Court was quite 
thorough in making this finding.  After the sentencing 
hearing, the Court recessed for a week in order to obtain 
additional details on the exact layout of Ed’s Pizza House.  
During this recess, the parties submitted video documentation 
of the store as well as photographs and diagrams indicating 
the physical measurements of the store.  By virtue of its 
locked door, separate walls and distance from the cash 
register, the District Court found the bathroom of the pizza 
shop to be a different location from the cash register area, a 
conclusion well within its considerable discretion. 
 
 “Unduly legalistic” and “punctilious” are words 
previously used to describe a less than flexible approach to 
finding a ‘change in location’ under the Guidelines’ definition 
of enhancement.  See, e.g., Hawkins, 87 F.3d at 728.  We 
agree and will not disturb the District Court’s finding.   
 
4. Facilitating the Offense 
 The record shows that Reynos, after kicking-in the 
bathroom door, reached in and unlocked it.  He then forced 
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Gutierrez and the other victims, at gunpoint, to leave the 
bathroom and move with him to the cash register area.  There, 
he forced Gutierrez to open the cash drawer, which Reynos 
then robbed.  The abduction enhancement requires that the 
offender force the victims to accompany him in order to 
facilitate either the commission of the crime or the offender’s 
escape.  U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1 app. note 1(a); 2B3.1(4)(A).  
Reynos clearly did not abduct the victims here to facilitate his 
escape.  After emptying the cash register, Reynos abandoned 
his victims and attempted to flee out the back door.  The 
victims escaped through the front entrance.  Instead, Reynos 
used Gutierrez to open the cash register, thereby facilitating 
his offense.  These are adequate facts to find that Reynos 
forced the victims to move to a different location for purposes 
of facilitating the commission of the crime.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 Our review of the record leads us to conclude that 
Reynos abducted the pizza shop employees during the 
commission of the robbery.  This is the type of case where the 
abduction enhancement is proper, even though the victims 
moved within a single structure.  Reynos broke open the 
locked bathroom door where the employees had secured 
themselves, extricated the employees and forced them—at the 
point of a gun—to move more than thirty-feet to a new 
location, the cash register area of the store.  Employee 
Gutierrez was then forced to open the cash drawer, thereby 
facilitating Reynos’ crime.  On these facts, the District Court 
did not err by applying the abduction enhancement to 
Reynos’ sentence. 
 
C. 
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 Having determined that the abduction enhancement 
was proper, we turn to Reynos’ argument that applying this 
enhancement amounted to “double counting.” Improper 
double counting occurs when a district court imposes two or 
more upward adjustments within the same Guideline range, 
when both are premised on the same conduct.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Fisher, 502 F.3d 293, 309 (3d Cir. 2007).  
Double-counting is prohibited by U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4, cmt. n. 4, 
which provides, “[if] a sentence under this Guideline is 
imposed in conjunction with a sentence for an underlying 
offense, do not apply any specific offense characteristic for 
possession, brandishing, use, or discharge of an explosive or 
firearm when determining the sentence for the underlying 
offense.”  Reynos argues that improper double-counting 
occurred here because the District Court enhanced his offense 
level for abduction premised on the fact that he used a 
handgun—conduct already covered by Count Three of the 
indictment.  That is to say, in sentencing Reynos to a ten year 
mandatory minimum for use of a handgun called for by 18 
U.S.C. § 924(c), the District Court improperly took into 
account the fact of the abduction enhancement.  We disagree. 
 
 First of all, abducting a person during the course of a 
robbery is not a “specific offense characteristic for 
possession, brandishing, use or discharge of an explosive or 
firearm.”  § 2K2.4.  Instead, the District Court’s enhancement 
addresses separate harm--the endangerment of the pizza shop 
workers by moving them to a different location in order to 
facilitate the commission of Reynos’ offense.  Here, even 
though the crime involves both an abduction and the use of a 
gun, separate provisions of the Guidelines are properly 
applied to capture the essence of Reynos’ offenses.   
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 Secondly, the application of the abduction 
enhancement in this case fits squarely into Fisher, supra.  
There, we held that “only when the Guidelines explicitly 
prohibit double counting will it be impermissible to raise a 
defendant’s offense level under one provision when another 
offense Guideline already takes into account the same 
conduct.” 502 F.3d at 309 (citing United States v. Wong, 3 
F.3d 667, 670 (3d Cir. 1993)).  Fisher involved a prosecution 
for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, based on a 
situation where the defendant pointed a firearm at a police 
officer.  There, we upheld both the enhancement for use of a 
firearm in connection with another felony offense and the 
additional enhancement for intent to cause bodily harm to a 
law enforcement officer.  Although these enhancements 
stemmed from the same incident, we held that “[o]nly when 
the Guidelines explicitly prohibit double counting will it be 
impermissible to raise a defendant’s offense level under one 
provision when another offense Guideline already takes into 
account the same conduct.”  Id.  The enhancements in Fisher 
did not constitute double counting because the Guidelines 
permitted the application of both.  One enhancement  
punished the use of a firearm while the other called for an 
enhancement based on the victim’s status as a police officer.  
Id.   
 
 Enhancing Reynos’ sentence was not double counting.  
The penalty for the robbery offense is set out in § 2B3.1 and 
the one for use of a firearm is found in § 2K2.4.  And, the 
four-point increase in the offense level for the abduction 
offense is found in § 2B3.1(b)(4)(A).  Reynos points to no 
explicit prohibitions here, so we find no improper double 
counting.  
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III. 
 The District Court has imposed a sentence that is 
procedurally correct.  We will, therefore, affirm its judgment. 
 
 
United States of America v. Quintrell Reynos, 
No. 11-1398 
 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge
 Under the Sentencing Guidelines, an abduction occurs 
when “a victim was forced to accompany an offender to a 
different location.”  U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1, comment (n.1(A)).  To 
illustrate this, commentary for the Guidelines states that 
“forcing a bank teller from the bank into a getaway car would 
constitute an abduction.”  Id.  The Guidelines’ example of 
forcibly taking someone from inside a bank to a getaway car 
outside the building stands in stark contrast to the case before 
us, where the bathroom and the cash register are separated by 
a distance of only 34 feet within an 803-square-foot pizza 
shop.  
, dissenting. 
The analysis of what qualifies as an abduction, and 
what does not, is subtle and nuanced.  Reasonable people can 
differ, and the side of the line I land is different than my 
colleagues.  For the reasons given below, I respectfully 
dissent.   
 The beginning point for my colleagues is that the term 
“location” “is broad enough to encompass different points of 
reference within the constructs of a single building or 
geographic site.”  Maj. Op. at 14.  I agree.  For example, 
shopping malls, office buildings, and apartment complexes 
may be single structures, but no one would dispute that they 
have different points of reference within them (various retail 
stores, different companies’ offices, and individual 
apartments), and hence have different locations.   
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 However, as the majority opinion notes, “the smaller 
the space, the more difficult it is to find a change in location.”  
Id. at 15.  I also agree.  But here my perspective parts with my 
colleagues.  To me, if the building or geographic site is small 
enough, and/or the distance traveled is short enough, there is 
only one point of reference, and, in turn, only one location.  
While their contention that even “the smallest of areas still 
may contain different locations[,]” id., is plausible in theory, 
in many situations involving a single small building or 
geographic site, and/or when only a short distance is traveled, 
it strains logic.   
 Such is the case with Ed’s Pizza House.  It is so 
small—803 square feet by my estimation of the 56’ by 14’4” 
shop—that I believe it is only one point of reference and thus 
only one location.  Many offices of senior persons in 
organizations are at least as big.   
 If a customer were standing near the bathroom door of 
Ed’s Pizza House and asked where he was located, he would 
say he was at Ed’s Pizza House.  If this same customer were 
then to walk to the cash register (34 feet away from the 
bathroom door) and again asked where he was located, I have 
no doubt that he still would say he was at Ed’s Pizza House.  
The short distance traveled within the same small shop leads 
me to conclude that there was not movement to a different 
location. 
 Contrast this with the example of a mall shopper who 
travels 34 feet across a walkway, leaving Store A and 
entering Store B.  While the distance traveled is the same as 
that in this case, the points of reference are undoubtedly 
different in the shopping mall example.  The shopper would 
first say he was at Store A and then say he was at Store B.  As 
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such, the mall shopper did, in fact, move to a different 
location in the example.  The same can be said for the 
apartment resident who walks across the hallway, leaving 
Apartment 1A and entering Apartment 1B.  While the 
distance traveled is short (likely even less than 34 feet), his 
location certainly changed from one apartment to the other.     
 Consider also the example of a farmer in his cornfield.  
He could walk hundreds of yards, but, because each position 
in his cornfield is amorphous, his location does not change.  
He still is in his cornfield no matter where he is located.     
 Thus, while I agree with the majority that a “highly 
flexible approach,” id., should be employed when analyzing 
the “different location” issue, these examples underscore the 
principle that, when only one building or geographic site is 
involved (especially a small building or site), and/or when 
only a short distance is traveled, there is a greater need for the 
crossing of some line of demarcation—a doorway, lot line, 
threshold, etc.—to find that there was movement to a 
different location.   To hold otherwise would “virtually 
ensure” that any movement at all would result in an abduction 
enhancement.  See United States v. Eubanks, 593 F.3d 645, 
654 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding, among other things, that 
abduction enhancement was inappropriate where an armed 
robber forced a store employee to the back room to retrieve a 
surveillance video).   
   I readily acknowledge that, even when only one 
building or geographic site is involved and/or when the 
distance traveled is not great, the abduction enhancement 
rightly can be applied to a defendant who forcibly moves a 
victim in a manner and/or for a reason that the abduction 
enhancement was specifically designed to prevent, such as 
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when the defendant isolated the victim, used the victim as a 
hostage or human shield, or forced the victim to accompany 
him during his getaway.  See United States v. Osborne, 514 
F.3d 377, 390-91 (4th Cir. 2008) (holding that abduction 
enhancement was applicable where defendant forced 
Walgreens employees at knifepoint from the pharmacy 
section, located in the back of the store, to the front door of 
the building; relying heavily on fact that the defendant forced 
the victims to accompany him so he could “keep[ ] [the] 
victims close by as readily accessible hostages”); United 
States v. Whooten, 279 F.3d 58, 61 (1st Cir. 2000) (observing 
that “the abduction enhancement is intended, at least in part, 
to protect victims against additional harm that may result 
from the victim’s isolation”); United States v. Hawkins, 87 
F.3d 722, 728 (5th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (holding that 
abduction enhancement was applicable where victims were 
dragged and forced at gunpoint from a pickup truck to a van 
that was 40-50 feet away within the same parking lot largely 
because the movement “was made in connection with a 
getaway”).  In such a situation, the aggravated nature of the 
defendant’s forcible movement of the victim likely tips the 
scale in favor of finding that there was movement to a 
different location despite there having been only one building 
or site involved and/or a short distance traveled.   
Absent an aggravating circumstance, however, there is 
little to support the finding of a different location when only 
one small building or site is involved, and/or when only a 
short distance is traveled, and there is no line of demarcation.  
This is because “transporting victims from one room to 
another is simply not enough for abduction” absent an 
aggravating circumstance (such as those described above) that 
is “‘plainly targeted by the abduction enhancement.’”  
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Eubanks, 593 F.3d at 653-54 (quoting Osborne, 514 F.3d at 
390).  “To find otherwise would virtually ensure that any 
movement of a victim from one room to another within the 
same building, without any other aggravating circumstances, 
would result in an abduction enhancement.”  Id. at 654.  
Application of the abduction enhancement thus would be 
inappropriate in such a situation.  
 There is no aggravating circumstance here.  Quintrell 
Reynos did not isolate one victim from the rest, he did not use 
any of them as a hostage, nor did he force any of them to 
accompany him in his getaway.  In fact, after Reynos 
obtained the money from the cash register and from Juan 
Gutierrez’s person, Reynos left the pizza shop through its 
back door while Gutierrez and the two other employees went 
out the front door.  It is difficult for me to see how the 
abduction enhancement is appropriate when the supposed 
abductor and his abductees left the building separately and 
through different doors.   
 It is true that Reynos forcibly moved the pizza shop 
employees from the bathroom to the cash register in order to 
facilitate the commission of a crime—the robbery.  However, 
this alone is insufficient to subject Reynos to the abduction 
enhancement.  To put into play that enhancement, whether for 
an escape or to facilitate a crime, there must be more than one 
location involved.  As explained above, I believe here only 
one location was involved, as all of the movement occurred 
within a single, and small, building and only a short distance 
was traveled.   
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 Accordingly, because I believe that the bathroom and 
cash register within the small pizza shop are not different 
locations, and because no aggravating circumstance exists, I 
would hold that the abduction enhancement does not apply to 
this case.   
 While I believe that the four-level abduction 
enhancement under § 2B3.1(b)(4)(A) should not be applied to 
Reynos’ sentence, I am skeptical that his term of 
imprisonment would be shorter in this case.  Reynos’ conduct 
appears clearly to warrant the two-level physical restraint 
enhancement under § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B), and that enhancement 
certainly would have been applied to his sentence had the 
District Court not applied the abduction enhancement.  As 
noted below, the mere two-level decrease in total offense 
level would have reduced the sentence range by only seven to 
nine months, with the low end of the sentence range for the 
higher offense level overlapping with the high end of the 
sentence range for the lower offense level.  The sentencing 
judge thus could have imposed the exact term of 
imprisonment on Reynos had the restraint enhancement been 
applied instead of the abduction enhancement.    
 Section 2B3.1(b)(4)(B) of the Sentencing Guidelines 
provides for a two-level increase “if any person was 
physically restrained to facilitate commission of the offense.”  
U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B).  “Physically restrained” means 
“the forcible restraint of the victim such as by being tied, 
bound or locked up.”  U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1, comment (n.1(K)).  
The qualifying phrase “such as” in this definition indicates 
that the words “tied, bound, or locked up” are listed by way 
of example rather than limitation.  United States v. Carter, 
410 F.3d 942, 954 (7th Cir. 2005).  Accordingly, physical 
restraint “is not limited to the examples listed in the 
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guidelines.”  United States v. Copenhaver, 185 F.3d 178, 180 
(3d Cir. 1999).  Moreover, “[f]orce is not limited to physical 
force, but may also encompass the operation of circumstances 
that permit no alternative to compliance.”  Carter, 410 F.3d at 
954 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).   
 In our case, Gutierrez and his two co-workers had no 
alternative but to comply with Reynos’ demands.  See id.  
(holding that restraint enhancement was applicable where the 
defendant forced a bank teller at gunpoint from the bank vault 
to her cash drawer against her will, explaining that, “with [the 
defendant’s] gun pointed at her from only inches away, [the 
bank teller] had no alternative but to comply with his 
instructions to move”).  Reynos’ conduct “was thus more 
culpable than a robber who does not forcibly restrain a victim 
to facilitate his offense.”  Id.  As such, I believe that the two-
level physical restraint sentence enhancement would be 
appropriate.  
 Consequently, it appears that the District Court still 
could have sentenced Reynos to 157 months’ imprisonment.  
He was subject to a mandatory consecutive 10-year prison 
sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) for discharging a firearm 
during the robbery (he fired his handgun several times in an 
effort to break the lock on the back door of the pizza shop 
while attempting to flee).  In addition, there is a base offense 
level of 20 for robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 1951.  U.S.S.G. 
§ 2B3.1.  Applying the two-level restraint enhancement 
would mean an offense level of 22 (as opposed to 24 if the 
four-level abduction enhancement were used).  With a three-
level stipulated downward adjustment for acceptance of 
responsibility, the total offense level becomes 19 (as opposed 
to 21 if the abduction enhancement were applied).  Even 
using Criminal History Category I (the lowest category), the 
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Guidelines’ range for imprisonment for an offense level of 19 
is 30 to 37 months, while the range is 37 to 46 months for 
offense level 21.  When this term is added to the 10-year 
mandatory consecutive prison sentence, the range for Reynos’ 
sentence was 150 to 157 months’ imprisonment.  Thus, 
Reynos still could have been sentenced to 157 months’ 
imprisonment even using the restraint enhancement instead of 
the abduction enhancement.  
*    *    *    *    * 
 With this context, I respectfully dissent but doubt that 
the net effect, even were my lack-of-abduction view to 
prevail, results in a reduction in sentence. 
